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The economy of southeastern Connecticut with-
out the Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun casinos would
be “Hamlet” without the Prince of Denmark.  In the
1980s, the region’s economy was submarines,
tourism, and ... submarines.  Then post-Cold-War
cuts in submarine procurement dealt the area a
haymaker blow, and despair loomed.  But wait—the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation began construc-
tion of Foxwoods in May 1991, and work began on
Mohegan Sun in 1995.  Today, high-stakes casinos
are the mainstay of the economy in and around
New London County.
Thanks to location and entrepreneurship, and
despite fierce state and local opposition, the south-
east corner of Connecticut has become a major
destination for high-stakes casino gaming.  The
spectacular growth of the casinos since 1992 has
created immense net gains for the state’s economy
and the State of Connecticut.  Some
negatives—e.g., local traffic and crime, and worries
about compulsive gambling—have so far failed to
dim the luster of the gleaming complexes that rise
up out of the second-growth forests of rural New
London County.
Important questions remain, of course, like the
proverbial other shoe waiting to drop. Will business
at Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun prove resistant to a
national recession?  And will one of the steadily
growing number of recognized Native American
tribes be able to raise table stakes to challenge the
dominant Foxwoods-Mohegan complex?
How We Got Here (in Brief)
The implausible saga of who brought Foxwoods


















Foxwoods opened its doors, did the State of
Connecticut, after kicking and screaming most of
the way, finally reach a full modus vivendi with the
Mashantucket Pequots.  Having lost its battle to
squelch the tribe’s hopes and dreams for a casino,
the State struck a deal: In return for allowing
Foxwoods—alone—to install highly profitable slot
machines in Connecticut, the State would receive
25% of the “win” (gross revenues less direct costs)
from the slots, but not less than $100 million a
year from 1994 on.  To date, the minimum has
never applied, as the graph belows shows.  (The
centerfold map in this issue details the State pay-
ments per capita from the Mashantucket Pequot
and Mohegan Fund in the current fiscal year; the
total of $135 million is some 40 percent of the
State’s projected take from the Fund and consti-
tutes 7% of all “statutory formula grants” to
municipalities.) 
Governor Weicker, who used executive powers to
cut the deal, thereby avoided legalizing slot
machines everywhere in the state.  But it was a
devil’s bargain, for the maneuver also gave
Foxwoods a highly effective barrier to entry.  The
Pequots made an exception for Mohegan Sun
(which pays the State the same slots royalty as
Foxwoods), but the grant of the “crown monop-
oly,” and the State’s budgetary reliance on its cut
of the proceeds, have effectively thwarted two sep-
arate tries by Las Vegas interests to enter the
Connecticut gaming market.
Toting up the Gains
It’s not rocket science that adding some 20,000
new casino jobs in southeastern Connecticut in
less than a decade would make a noticeable differ-
ence, statewide as well as regionally.  Two studies
of Foxwoods’ economic impact have indeed found
significant gains in jobs and earnings in the region,
plus attendant positive effects on house prices and
public welfare programs.
In 1993, a team of private consultants to
Foxwoods (including the present author and anoth-
er editor of The Quarterly, Dennis Heffley), using
economic base analysis, found that (in the long
run) every new casino job adds 1.107 jobs in New
London County and 0.74 jobs elsewhere in
Connecticut. Including Mohegan Sun, those multi-
pliers translate 20,000 new casino jobs today into
another 37,000 in the state. (By comparison,
Electric Boat is down 10,000 workers since 1990).
Using average earnings per job, the casinos are
generating  extra earnings (in today’s dollars) of
more than $1.25 billion per year in New London
County and another half billion dollars elsewhere
in Connecticut.
Late last year the Connecticut Center for
Economic Analysis (CCEA), which also publishes
The Quarterly, published the results of a more
elaborate study of Foxwoods’ economic impact.
Using a macroeconomic forecasting model, sup-
ported by an intersectoral or “input-output” model
for the state, the CCEA concluded that Foxwoods
12 The Connecticut Economy Winter 2001
On This Roll of the Dice, 
Southestern Connecticut 
(And the Rest of Us) Got Lucky
Foxwoods Casino State’s Take from Slot’s “Win”









d13 The Connecticut Economy Winter 2001
alone is adding $1.2 billion in gross state product
(an increase of 0.89%) and more than 41,000 jobs
(+1.80%), above a baseline forecast absent the
casino.  Again scaling up to include Mohegan Sun,
the CCEA’s findings are consistent with the 1993
results.
Both studies concluded that the casino-derived
gains in jobs and earnings translate into discernible
drops in the numbers of people receiving AFDC
welfare payments statewide, and sizeable increases
in single-home prices in New London County.
Further, both sets of estimates are long-run and
enduring, so long as the casinos continue to pros-
per.  And the same caveat applies to both: they
ignore the effects of offsetting activities displaced
by the casinos (e.g., dog racing) or deterred from
starting up by the existence of the casinos.  Even
with hefty discounts for such offsets, though, the
weight of the evidence compellingly shows large
net positive gains for the southeastern region and
the rest of Connecticut.
Downsides
Traffic congestion.  Crime.  Gambling addiction.
Lower profits for organized crime.  Legalized high-
stakes gaming has its downsides, to be sure, but to
an extent they are in the eye of the beholder.
Doubtless the New England Mob finds Foxwoods
and Mohegan Sun “unfair competition”.  (Why
would anyone prefer shooting craps in the warm
comfort of a casino, where the drinks are cheap
and the security discreet, instead of on the third
deck of a downtown Hartford parking garage at
night, where the “late charge” on a loan may be a
broken kneecap?)  Many economists argue for
legalizing certain criminal activities, among them
gambling, because they are “victimless”.  Their
point is that most of the violence and corruption
associated with such crimes is a product more of
the illegality than of the activity itself.
The economists’ arguments assume rational
human behavior, but what of pathological behav-
iors?  The victims of compulsive gaming, besides
the individals themselves, include their families
and other dependents, plus employers, and credi-
tors.  Interestingly, gambling addiction has received
growing attention only in the past two decades—
coincident with the growth of legalized commercial
(as opposed to charitable) gambling, which of
course includes all those state lotteries.  Only in
1994 did the American Psychiatric Association add
pathological gambling to its standard manual of
mental disorders.  Because the problem is mainly
self-reported, we lack the data to compare the inci-
dence of the pathology before and after Foxwoods
opened.  The Pequots and Mohegans both publicly
acknowledge the potential for addiction, are at
pains to identify and “cut off” problem gamblers,
and support treatment and research financially.
The towns around the Mashantucket Pequot and
Mohegan reservations also are victims of  the traf-
fic congestion and increased crime that have been
thrust on them.  Economic change always engen-
ders losers as well as gain-
ers.  The economist’s stan-
dard nostrum—find ways to
compensate the losers—is
easier said than done.
Intangible costs like unex-
pectedly losing a peaceful
rural lifestyle are hard to
measure and expensive to
remedy, even imperfectly.
The towns around
Foxwoods spurned the cash
and payments in lieu of taxes that the tribe offered
them early on.  Today, town officials (at least pub-
licly) do not regard the improved property tax
bases and State aid from the slots Fund as ade-
quate compensation for the congestion dumped in
their laps by the huge success of high-stakes gam-
ing in their nook of the Quiet Corner.
Gainers and losers?  One immediate effect of
Foxwoods’ opening its doors was reportedly that
local businesses lost much of their hired help,
lured away by casino jobs. 
Will the Other Shoe Drop?
The news media are abuzz about a national eco-
nomic slowdown that may become a r–––––––n.
If the dreaded r-word comes to pass, it will be the
first one since Foxwoods opened in February 1992.
Would or will it take the bloom off southeastern
Connecticut’s rose?
Maybe yes, maybe no.  High-stakes gaming may
be as sensitive to hard times as any other con-
sumer good or service.  But Foxwoods did, after
all, take off like a shot while New England, and
especially Connecticut, were still mired in the eco-
nomic pit dug for them in the early 1990s by
defense cuts, the financial-sector meltdown, and
the concomitant real estate collapse.  Also, an eco-
nomic downturn often affects entertainment
providers unequally; e.g., gamblers may play at
home instead of flying to Monaco.  The experiment
that will decide this question may be imminent.
The day before the Bush-II inaugural, the acting
director of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
granted preliminary recognition to the Nipmucs,
who have made noises about building a casino in
northeastern Connecticut.  The Nipmucs are but
one of many groups in the region seeking BIA
recognition.
How would the Pequots and the Mohegans
respond to a third tribe’s entry into Connecticut’s
crown-monopoly sweepstakes?  Should the State of
Connecticut try to enforce its deal with the two
existing casinos?  Would Connecticut’s stance alter
thinking in Boston or Providence?  More funda-
mentally, would the regional gaming market sup-
port a third big casino?  The same imponderables,
of course, would give pause to prospective lenders
to the Nipmucs. 
So you thought the controversy about legal gam-
ing in Connecticut was over?  Stay tuned.